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Abstract 
This study examines the influence of participative budgeting on budgetary slack in composing nine local 
governments’ budget of Bali Province, using ‘career uncertainty’ as the moderating variable. The ‘career 
uncertainty’ has received insufficient attention in previous studies on budgetary slack. This study tries to fill this 
gap. Respondents of this study are 686 middle level employees. The results show that career uncertainty can 
moderate the relationship between participative budgeting and budgetary slack. The more certain local government 
employees that they will be placed at the same position in the period of budget realization, the larger the budgetary 
slack will be. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The management process of a government institution is started by composing a budget. Operationally, a local 
government budget is composed by executives who will then ask for approval from the legislative member (i.e. 
known as DPRD). This budget will be used to assess the performance of executives by comparing the budget 
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estimation with its realization. In composing a budget, this activity often produces problem caused by budgetary 
slack, as a result of undisclosed of the real capabilities. This is reflected by the income source coming from 
‘Budget Surplus’ (i.e. known as SILPA) which might come from either income realization which is larger than 
budgeted, or from efficiency of spending or inability to maximize the absorption of budgetary spending.  
Previous studies showed the inconsistent effect of participative budgeting on budgetary slack. Onsi (1973), 
Merchant (1985) and Abdullah (2004) found that participative budgeting has a negative influence on the budgetary 
slack. Meanwhile, Lowe and Shaw (1968) in Yuwono (1998), also Young (1985) found that participative 
budgeting positively influence the budgetary slack. Collins (1978) found that participative budgeting did not 
influence budgetary slack. Govindarajan (1986) believes that another approach is necessary to explain the 
inconsistencies between several variables being studied. This approach can take the form of agency model or use 
various contingency models as the predictor.  
In Indonesia, a local government budget is composed started by composing the budget at the task force level 
(i.e. known as Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah or SKPD). This condition creates possibilities for staff to create 
budgetary slack to make it easier to realize the budget (i.e. budget absorption). This attitude is also influenced by 
how certain the personnel whether he/she will be placed at the same position in the next year. The more certain 
he/she is about his/her position (i.e. continuity of his/her position), the higher the possibility of budgetary slack 
will be. Based on the illustration above, we can derive the research question of whether career uncertainty 
influences the relationship between participative budgeting and budgetary slack within the budget composition of 
local governments in Bali Province.  
This study discusses the agency problem which can occur in participative budgeting mechanism through a 
budgetary slack, moderated by career uncertainty. Therefore, this study aims to assess the influence of career 
uncertainty on the relationship between participative budgeting and budgetary slack in composing a local 
governments’ budget in Bali Province. The result of this study is expected to give contribution to professions and 
practitioners to be implemented in practice and in decision making. Theoretical contribution of this study is 
connected to the adoption of the agency theory in explaining the relationship between executive members as the 
agent and legislative members as the principal. The results of this study can also useful as a consideration in 
making policies, especially in deciding directions. Hence, a budget can be composed optimally.  
 
2. Theory and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Budget and agency theory 
 
The agency theory explains the relationship between two parties involved in a contract which consist of an 
agent as the party given the responsibility of a task and a principal as the party who deliver the responsibility. This 
condition results in a consequence that parties, agent and principal will try to maximize their utility (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The separation between the agent and the principal causes an agency problem. This problem 
occurs because of the tendency of management to perform moral hazard in maximizing their interest by sacrificing 
the principal.  
A budget is a tool of planning and controlling system so that the governmental system can be done efficiently 
and effectively. In composing a budget, there is an agency relationship between executive members as the agent 
and the legislative members as the principal. Budget is also the document of a political contract between executive 
and legislative members for the future (Mardiasmo, 2002).  
 
2.2 Participative budgeting and budgetary slack 
 
The quality of a budget depends highly on the process of how such budget is composed. A budget can be 
composed either by superiors or by a staff who perform the budget, known as the participative budgeting. In this 
budgeting system, managers actively participate in composing their own budget. The management process of states 
finance started by composing a budget. Mardiasmo (2002) states that the form of state’s autonomy is carried out 
through the use of resources economically and efficiently to achieve public accountability. To achieve this, a 
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proper budget is required as an early step in managing existing resource. Operationally, a budget is composed by 
executives who will then ask for approval from the legislative members. This budget will be used as a basis to 
evaluate the performance of executive members after comparing with the budget realization. 
The budget is composed by staff in each task force (i.e. SKPD). This budget is the basis to evaluate the 
performance of SKPD in the next year (i.e. the year of budget realization). In this condition, it is possible for 
employees to perform budgetary slack to make the realization easier (budget absorption). This attitude is also 
influenced by how certain the employee that he/she will stay at the same position in the next year (i.e. in the 
budget realization). The higher level of certainty (i.e. continuity of the position) will result a higher possibility that 
they will perform a budgetary slack. The confidence level will be very different for each individual because the 
absence of rules for someone’s mutation in each state government. The absence of the rule in this mutation causes 
uncertainty, mainly during the budget is composed. Budgetary slack occurs when a manager deliberately make an 
excessive demand on resources exceeding the real budget needs or manager deliberately state their productivity 
lower than their actual productivity. Hence, there is a chance to choose a benchmark used to assess the 
performance (Young, 1985; Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998; Schift & Lewin, 1970).  
 
2.3 Previous research and hypothesis development 
 
Several studies found that budgetary slack caused by several factors, such as participative budgeting. Previous 
studies on the influence of participative budgeting on budgetary slack showed inconsistent results. Young (1985) 
found that companies who give rewards to employees based on budget achievement has a positive relationship 
between participative budgeting and budgetary slack. This research is supported by other studies, for instance: 
Lukka (1988) and Dunk (1993). Meanwhile, other researchers showed different result, such as Onsi (1973), 
Merchant (1985), and Abdullah (2004). In contrast to the result above, Collins (1978) found that participative 
budgeting did not influence the budgetary slack.  
Govindarajan (1986) believes a different approach is important to explain the inconsistent relationship between 
several variables studied if the result is inconsistent. This approach can be done through either the agency model or 
by using various contingency models as predictor. For instance, Suhartono (2006) examined the influence of 
budget goal clarity on budgetary slack moderated by organizational commitment. The result indicated that 
organizational commitment can moderate the relationship between goal clarity and budgetary slack in a 
government body. Ikhsan (2007) studied the influence of budget participation on budgetary slack using five 
moderating variables, showed that strategic uncertainty, environment uncertainty, organizational commitment and 
leadership style were functioned as the quasi moderator.  
Our study uses career uncertainty as the moderating variable that influence the relationship between 
participative budgeting and budgetary slack. Budgetary slack in participative budgeting occurs when someone 
knows that his/her performance will be judged based on the budget realization. This circumstance motivates 
him/her to unreveal their optimum ability during the composing of a budge. This attitude might be different when a 
staff clearly knows whether he/she will be involved or not in the budget execution. If a staff knows that he/she will 
be involved in the budget realization then there is a tendency that the individual will perform a higher budgeting 
slack, and vice versa. From the questionnaires results, it can be concluded that the level of career certainty for staff 
of local governments is still low in general. A mutation can be done without any clear rules. This high uncertainty 
affects an employee’s behaviour at the time the budget is composed. From the above mentioned explanations, the 
following hypothesis has been developed: 
H0: Career uncertainty does not influence the relationship between participative budgeting and budgetary 
slack in composing local governments’ budget in Bali Province. 
H1: Career uncertainty influences the relationship between participative budgeting and budgetary slack in 
composing local governments’ budget in Bali Province. 
 
3. Research method 
 
3.1 Population, sample and data source 
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This study uses primary data obtained through survey. The sample is taken using purposive sampling. 
Respondents of this study are middle level employees, such as sub-department head of Finance and sub-
department head of Planning and General Affairs in each SKPD of nine local governments in Bali Province. They 
have to be in their current position for a minimum of one year to ensure that they have sufficient knowledge and 
experience in answering the questionnaires. Respondents were selected at the task force level (i.e. SKPD) because 
they have to compose, to use and to report the budget realization (Abdullah, 2004). For each SKPD, we took two 
respondents. In total, we have 686 respondents. 
 
3.2 Variable measurement 
 
This study uses participative budgeting as the independent variable, budgetary slack as the dependent variable 
and career uncertainty as the moderating variable. These variables were measured by questionnaires adopted from 
previous related studies.  
 
3.2 Participative budgeting 
 
Participative budgeting is an involvement or the influence of a staff or subordinate in composing a budget. The 
measurement for subordinate involvement is done by using instrument developed by Milani (1975), as this 
instrument has a sufficient validity level and already used in previous studies. In this instrument, each respondent 
was asked to answer 6 questions using scale one to five. Scale one showed highest level of participation, while 
scale five showed lowest level of participation.  
 
3.3 Budgetary slack 
 
Budget slack is a tendency in composing a budget to unreveal their optimum ability in the budget composition 
process. The measurement of budgetary slack was done using an instrument developed by Onsi (1973) with four 
questions using five scales. Scale one showed the highest level of budgetary slack, while scale five showed the 
lowest level of budgetary slack.  
 
3.4 Career uncertainty  
 
Career uncertainty is someone’s level of confidence that he/she will remain at the same position when a budget 
is composed and realized. This level of confidence highly influences the disclosure ability at the time when the 
budget is composed. The career uncertainty was measured using the instrument developed by Riyanto (2001) with 
some modifications. Each respondent was asked to answer five questions with a scale of one to five which showed 
respondent’s perception on career uncertainty. The scale of five showed the highest level of uncertainty, while the 
scale of one showed the lowest level of uncertainty.  
 
4. Data analysis technique 
 
4.1 Data quality testing 
 
This study obtained data through questionnaire. The reliability measurement was done by calculating the alpha 
cronbach coefficient of each instrument of the variables. Nunnaly (1978) in Ghozali (2002) states that instruments 
are reliable if they have alpha cronbach coefficient close to 1. The validity test was done by data homogeneity 
testing, using correlation test with a score from question item with total score (i.e. Pearson Correlation) and 
significance level of 1 percent. If the correlation coefficient is significant then the question item in the instrument 
is valid. Hypothesis testing was done using multiple regression analysis to test the moderation effect. The use of 
this model requires several conditions for its implementation. Hence, the linear estimator will not bias. The 
classical assumption testing was done through non-multicolinearity, normality, and homokedasticity tests. 
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5. Result and discussion 
 
5.1 Respondents profile 
 
The numbers of questionnaires were 718, which were directly delivered by the researcher. The number of 
returned questionnaires were 610 (84.96%), while 15.04 percent was not used because they were incomplete and 
did not fulfil the criteria (i.e. has no involvement in composing the local government’s budget). There were 
66.61% males, while 33.39 were females. Most respondents were head of sub unit (87.07%), and about 62.47% 
respondents had experience 1-2 years in their current position. Most of respondents had a bachelor degree 
(68.04%) and their age were mostly around 40-49 years old (51.53%). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistic for 
data analysed and presents standard deviation of each variable that lower than the mean value. This reflects that the 
data have an equal distribution.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Y 557 1,00 4,80 3,3176 0,58881 
X1 557 1,00 3,79 2,3304 0,53223 
X2 557 1,00 4,64 3,2239 0,62403 
Valid N (list wise) 557     
 
5.2 Hypothesis testing 
 
Research hypothesis stated that career uncertainties influence the relationship between participative budgeting 
and budgetary slack on local governments’ budget of Bali province. The testing result using multiple regression is 
presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Hypothesis Testing Result   
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients  
t 
 
Sig B Std. Error Beta 
1(Constant) 1,479 0,259  5,714 0,000 
X1  0 ,262 0,084 0,396 3,133 0,002 
X2 0,468 0,081 0,496 5,758 0,000 
X1X2 -0,049 0,023 -0,363 -2,104 0,036 
Adjusted R Square =0,195 
F=44,574 Sig.=0, 000 
 
Adjusted R Square of 0,195 means that 19,5% of budgetary slack variance can be explained by participative 
budgeting, career uncertainty and interaction between participative budgeting with budgetary slack, while 80,5% 
explained by factors outside the model. Anova test results 44,574 with significance level is smaller than 0,05 
means that the regression model can be used to predict budgetary slack. It can be said that participative budgeting, 
career uncertainty and interaction between participative budgeting with budgetary slack simultaneously influence 
the budgetary slack.  
The influence of career uncertainty on the relation between participative budgeting and budgeting slack showed 
by t value -0,049 with significance level 0,036. This result indicates that career uncertainty can moderate the 
relationship between participative budgeting and budgetary slack. The negative value of t value showed adverse 
influence of the relationship. The result implies that the higher (lower) level of someone’s career uncertainty in a 
position at the time of budget realization, then the smaller (bigger) the budgetary slack will be. The slack is 
established to make his/her performance looked good because this reflect that he/she is able to execute the job 
according to the budget. 
The results of this study support previous related studies on budgeting slack, such as Suhartono (2006) and 
Ikhsan (2007). This study supports the agency theory which explain that in the relation between an agent and a 
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principal, both parties will try to maximize their own utility. In this study, the agency theory is worthwhile to 
explain the willingness of local governments’ staff to maximize their interests in composing a budget. 
 
6. Conclusion and suggestion 
 
Based on the data analysis and discussion, this study finds that career uncertainty can moderate the relation 
between participative budgeting and budgetary slack in composing local governments’ budget in Bali Province. 
This is shown by the significance level of 0,036. Hypothesis testing results show that the higher level of 
uncertainty that someone will be placed at the same position in the time of budget realization, then the smaller the 
budgetary slack will be, and the other way around. The budgetary slack was performed so that the increase of 
performance can be seen in relation to the budget (i.e. comparison with the targeted performance). 
For the executives and legislative members as the authority holders in composing the budget, the result of this 
study can be used as a consideration in making policies concerning local government budget. In addition, this 
study can be useful to determine certain conditions required in order to allow the budget composed optimally. This 
study can also be fruitful in determining job mutation by showing more transparent job criteria, because the career 
clarity of local governments’ staff can influence their attitudes, especially in composing a budget. 
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